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	<title>Comments on: PINs hacked from ATM transaction processing software</title>
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	<description>Gadgets, gear and computer hardware.</description>
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		<title>By: SomeUser</title>
		<link>http://www.crunchgear.com/2008/07/03/pins-hacked-from-atm-transaction-processing-software/comment-page-1/#comment-756194</link>
		<dc:creator>SomeUser</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:24:28 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I&#039;ve read several accounts of crackers discovering that the encryption modules on a disturbingly large number of ATMs are left at the default settings - they never change or update the key or passphrase, OR the management/superuser passphrase.  This means that if you find out what one is, you can monitor the transactions of many, many others, let alone get into the administrator&#039;s console on the machine itself.  I don&#039;t know for certain that&#039;s what happened here, but I can say I&#039;ve never trusted an ATM the same way again.

Banks themselves realize they scrutiny they&#039;re under, but the contract agencies or clearinghouses that participate in the flow of our personal banking information (from the bank, across a clearinghouse, over the internet, and to the ATM, rented by the 7-11 down the road provided by the 3rd party ATM distributor) should be under equal protection, audit, and scrutiny.  Most of what I&#039;ve heard/read tells me that the people who set up the equipment and maintain/manage it are severely undertrained, and don&#039;t take into account the high level of sensitivity that should be mandatory.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ve read several accounts of crackers discovering that the encryption modules on a disturbingly large number of ATMs are left at the default settings &#8211; they never change or update the key or passphrase, OR the management/superuser passphrase.  This means that if you find out what one is, you can monitor the transactions of many, many others, let alone get into the administrator&#8217;s console on the machine itself.  I don&#8217;t know for certain that&#8217;s what happened here, but I can say I&#8217;ve never trusted an ATM the same way again.</p>
<p>Banks themselves realize they scrutiny they&#8217;re under, but the contract agencies or clearinghouses that participate in the flow of our personal banking information (from the bank, across a clearinghouse, over the internet, and to the ATM, rented by the 7-11 down the road provided by the 3rd party ATM distributor) should be under equal protection, audit, and scrutiny.  Most of what I&#8217;ve heard/read tells me that the people who set up the equipment and maintain/manage it are severely undertrained, and don&#8217;t take into account the high level of sensitivity that should be mandatory.</p>
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